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Introduction1 
At present, 70% of the Russian population are entitled to a large variety of social benefits. Esti-
mates based on data from service suppliers and government agencies paying social benefits put 
the number of benefit receivers at about 100 million. The current system of social benefits and 
benefit payment mechanisms has limited potential for redistributing resources to those who 
need them most. In addition, Russia does not have an adequate system of accounting for social 
payments and benefit provision, which creates problems in defining the responsibilities of both 
benefit providers and recipients. 
Trying to push towards greater efficiency of social policy, while cutting overall spending (a goal 
shared at present by all welfare states, East and West), the Putin administration has so far fo-
cused specifically on three objectives:  
• Centralization of financial resources allocated for fulfilling social guarantees (e.g., 
elimination of off-budget social funds); 
• Redistribution of the social-support burden between various levels of government on 
the one hand, and employees and employers on the other hand; 
• Provision of social benefits on the basis of targeting (means test). 
With the stabilization plan in 1998 measures to achieve these goals have been incorporated into 
the governments social and economic reform strategy. In July 2000, the government approved 
the Strategy of Russia's Development in the years 2000-2010 (the so-called Gref Plan), 
which emphasizes the need to improve the efficiency of the social insurance system. The intro-
duction of the Unified Social Tax, and therefore the reform of the collection and distribution of 
financial resources allocated for social payments, represents a central part of this strategy. 
This paper presents an analysis of the introduction of the Unified Social Tax. We ask what the 
main changes are in the areas of financing and collecting social security contributions, and how 
these changes affect social policy reform in the fields of pensions, health, and employment. 
In the first section (Social Policy 1999/2000: Starting Point for the Second Wave of Reforms), 
we will describe the legacy of the Yeltsin era, the starting point for the second wave of reforms 
in social policy. Section two (The Unified Social Tax: Basis for Funding) gives an overview 
over the newly introduced Social Tax and the related political debate. This new method of col-
lecting social insurance contributions directly affects three areas of social policy: pensions, 
health, and employment. In section three (Specific Social Policy Fields), we outline current 
reforms in each of these three fields. The last section (Findings) sums up the main findings and 
evaluates the implications of the Unified Social Tax for Russias current social policy. 
Up to now there are no academic studies which describe or analyse the Unified Social Tax and 
its implications. As a consequence, this article relies heavily on up-to-date information provided 
by Russian media, statistics, and interviews. Moreover, we would like to point out one particu-
lar limitation of this work. This article takes a state-centralistic approach. We therefore 
largely ignore the role and contributions of non-state actors, as well as of Russias regions and 
their relations with the federal centre in the provision of social policy. 
                                                     
1 The authors would like to thank Tat'yana Maleva (Carnegie Foundation, Moscow), Lev Savulkin (Leontief Centre 
for Economic Research (Tsentr ekonomicheskikh issledovanii Leont'eva)), St. Petersburg), Katharina Mueller (Uni-
versity Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder) and Andreas Heinrich (Institute for East European Studies, Berlin) for their valu-
able support and advice. 
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Social Policy 1999/ 2000: Starting Point for the Second Wave of 
Reforms (Susanne Nies) 
Social Policy in Putins Russia: Bringing the State back in 
Reform Incentives 
When Putin came to power at the end of 1999, he inherited a system of weak and dispersed 
government. Intransparency, corruption, shadow economy and barter trade had become domi-
nant features of the post-Soviet economy. Due to a complicated legal system, foreign direct 
investment remained insignificant. The defeat in the first Chechnya War, the intervention by 
NATO in Kosovo and the financial crisis of August 1998 reinforced the overall impression of 
Russian decline.2 
The rise of raw material prices and a favourable distribution of power in the upper house of the 
parliament presented a unique opportunity for a re-design of government. This is all the more 
important as forecasts predict falling oil prices from late 2001 with a consequent negative im-
pact on the budget.3 
The new administration prioritised the restoration of central government. The creation of seven 
super-regions situated administratively between the centre and the 89 subjects and the redirec-
tion of fiscal flows are part of this strategy. Public policy and thus social policy are strongly 
dependent on the success of this change in terms of trade. Supplementary specific social policy 
reforms have to address two other major points: the targeting of social spending, and specific 
reforms in social policy sectors (health, employment, pensions, education etc.). 
Government and Federalism 
One important consequence of federalism Yeltsin-style was the absence of a clear division of 
powers and responsibilities between federal, regional and local entities. The huge regional 
autonomy which existed from 1992 onwards meant in practice liberty without responsibility. 
New mechanisms of bypassing obligations emerged, such as the creation of extra-budgetary 
funds  perceived to be a panacea to all budgetary problems. The social situation of Russian 
citizens became strongly dependent on the capacities and the economic potential of the regions 
of which they were residents. The best off were and are the citizens of the countries top dozen 
regions: Moscow, Moscow Oblast, St. Petersburg (the prime gateway regions); Samara, Niz-
hny Novgorod, Perm, Sverdlovsk, (industrial regions with good infrastructure); Tatarstan, 
Bashkortostan (rich in resources, with a good infrastructure), Krasnoyarsk (Norilsk Nikel, the 
largest non-ferrous metal producer in Russia), Irkutsk, Tyumen (Gazprom, the oil and gas gi-
ant).4 
The Bottom Ten are regions such as Marii El, Republic of Adygeya, Republic of Northern 
Ossetia, Republic of Kalmykia, Chita Oblast, Republic of Dagestan, Jewish Autonomous 
Oblast, Republic of Ingushetia, and Republic of Tuva. The GDP per capita of Tyumen for 1999 
was ten times as large as the GDP per capita of Kalmykia.5 Better-off regions preferred to sup-
                                                     
2 Cf. Fruchtmann, Jakob / Pleines, Heiko: Das russische Steuersystem. Profil und erste Ergebnisse des Forschungs-
projekts Wirtschaftskulturelle Faktoren in Steuergesetzgebung und Steuerpraxis der Russischen Föderation, Ar-
beitspapiere und Materialien der Forschungsstelle Osteuropa No. 25, Bremen 2001, p. 8. 
3 Russia economy: Falling oil prices. Economist Intelligence Unit, 4.12.2001, published on the internet at: 
http://www.securities.co.uk/ 
4 Cf. UNDP: Human Development Report 1998-2000, Russias Prosperity by Regions, Washington, published on the 
internet at: http://www.undp.org 
5 Smith, Graham: The Post-Soviet States, London 1999, p. 194. 
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port their needy instead of participating in fiscal redistribution between federal entities. Soli-
darity with the state was everywhere on the wane. For an overview of the main taxes and their 
distribution between the centre and the regions see Table 1. The distribution of these revenues 
was sharply criticised by the regions, mostly because the lions share of the important VAT 
went to the centre.6 
Table 1: Division of Tax Revenues between Centre and Region in 1998 
Tax Percentage to the centre Percentage to the region 
Excise (energy and imports) 100 0 
VAT 75 25 
Excise (domestically 
produced Alcohol) 
50 50 
Profit Tax 37 63 
Personal income tax 0 100 
Source: Nelson, Erick / Breach, Al: Russia: The Federation and its subjects  How much decentralisation, in: Gold-
mann Sachs, 30.11.1998, p 17. 
Nevertheless there is no simple answer concerning the role of the regions during the 90s: Local 
administrations behaved irresponsibly, some regions were simply overburdened with their social 
problems, some became laboratories of reform: from communist reforms such as in Ulyanovsk 
to liberal ones such as in Nizhny Novgorod. 
Inefficiency of social spending and the absence of targeting 
One hundred million Russians, or seventy percent of the population, are today entitled to bene-
fits.7  According to official estimates, only one third of allocations go to the really needy  8 
there is as yet no efficient targeting. The old Soviet system of l'goty9 remained intact. People are 
often entitled to l'goty because of risks they have undergone in the past: participation in wars 
etc. 
                                                     
6 Cf. Nicholson, Martin: Towards a Russia of the Regions, London 1999, p. 33. 
7 Cf. Kosmarsky, Vladimir: Social Policy. First Steps towards reform, in: Russian Economic Trends Monthly, The 
Centre for Economic Reforms, 9.1.2001, published on the internet at: http://www.securities.co.uk/ 
8 Cf. Kosmarsky, Vladimir: Social Policy. First Steps towards reform, in: Russian Economic Trends Monthly, The 
Centre for Economic Reforms, 9.1.2001, published on the internet at: http://www.securities.co.uk/ 
9 Literally benefits, privileges. 
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Overview: Social policy allocations in 2000 
Total number of persons entitled to 
social assistance in 2000 
100 million citizens = 70 % of the Russian popula-
tion 
Benefits by categories 256 categories of citizens are entitled to social 
benefits. 
Entitlements are dependent on 
• risks from former times (e.g. participa-
tion in wars and other risks of the past 
which entailed a higher than average 
risk) 
• kind and conditions of employment, both 
in the past and in the future 
• duration of employment (Hero of labour) 
• health (invalidity) 
• number of children 
Number of different kinds of social 
transfers 
256 kinds of social transfers 
Compiled by Susanne Nies, Berlin 2001. 
Specific reform requirements in social policy sectors 
The introduction of the Unified Social Tax is a response to problems of the funding side. At a 
lower level, specific social policy problems have to be addressed. The most urgent requirements 
for reform concern wages in the public sector, the erosion of public health, the pension reform 
and specific regional problems. 
The Unified Social Tax: Basis for Funding (Gesa Walcher) 
Brief History of Tax Legislation Reforms 
For about a decade, Russian tax legislation was based on a basic law of December 1991.10 It 
specified a range of federal, regional and local taxes. A set of laws on specific taxes (VAT, 
profit tax and income for banks and insurance companies, etc) entered into force in 1992. The 
tax system was structured similarly to that of Western industrial countries, but its drawbacks, 
including an enormous tax burden on enterprises, became more and more obvious. During the 
years of transition, numerous amendments to these laws were made, most of them ad hoc and 
aimed at solving isolated problems, without tackling the whole system - which, as a conse-
quence, became more and more complicated. As a starting point for a complex and comprehen-
sive tax reform, a new Tax Code was  submitted to the Duma in early 1996, after three years of 
preparatory work. Initially, it had been expected that the Code would have passed through the 
Duma the end of 1996 at the latest, but this did not happen. In June 1997 the general part had 
been passed in the first reading with a large number of amendments, so that the adoption of the 
document was postponed. A new version of the Tax Code was submitted to the Duma only in 
February 1998.11 
                                                     
10 Zakon RF ot 27.12.1991 Nr. 2118-I Ob osnovakh nalogovoi sistemy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, in: Vedomosti 
Soveta narodnykh deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR 11/1992, St. 52. 
11 For an overview of the development of the Russian tax system, see: Himes, Susan / Miliet-Einbinder, Martine: 
Russias Tax Reform, OECD Observer 215/1999; Seidel, Bernhard / Schooten, Mechthild: Fiscal Federalism and 
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The first real steps towards standardisation and reform of the tax system were made in 1999 
with the adoption of the first part of the Tax Code, which established basic tax terms and princi-
ples of tax administration. The adoption of this document increased standardisation and simpli-
fication of the system. However, this first part of the Code brought only limited changes to the 
application of the new rules in real life. In practice, changes were dependent on the introduction 
of the operative chapters of the Code. 
This process began in summer 2000 when the Duma passed the chapters of Part Two of Tax 
Code in the second reading, which regulates taxation of individuals. The new legislation is 
based mainly on the proposals of German Grefs Centre of Strategic Research.12 
The new taxation rules reduce the level of personal income tax from 30% (top marginal rate) to 
a flat rate of 13% for residents and introduces a penalty rate of 35% on income derived from 
insurance-based, loan-bonus and bank deposit arrangements. Non-residents have to pay a rate of 
30% on income from Russian sources. Furthermore, the legislation introduces a Unified Social 
Tax (UST, discussed below), pooling payments to the Social Insurance Fund, the Pension Fund 
and the mandatory Medical Insurance Fund. The new legislation entered into force on 1 January 
2001. 
The main aims of the tax reform are: lowering the overall tax burden, increasing equality within 
the tax system, simplifying the tax system by reducing the number of tax rates, and improving 
tax administration and tax collection. The overall tax burden is predicted to decrease by around 
2% of GDP in 2001 and by more than 5% in the medium term. 
The UST: Facts and Figures 
The UST, as part of the new tax legislation, is meant to replace many mandatory deductions that 
employers were formerly required to withhold from the salaries of employees and transfer to the 
Pension Fund, the Social Insurance Fund and the Medical Fund.13 This consolidation of several 
payroll taxes simplifies the tax system and alleviates the tax burden on the payroll fund, which 
had amounted to 46% of the total. Employers contributions to the Employment Fund have been 
abolished and the Fund will thus be financed exclusively via personal income tax revenue (1% 
of 13% of the personal income tax is allocated to the Employment Fund). Fees required for 
mandatory social insurance to cover accidents at work and professional diseases are not in-
cluded in the UST, but will nevertheless be levied in the future according to current legislation 
on such payments. 
Application of the Regressive Scale 
The new chapter of the tax code introduces a regressive scale of the UST. The tax base is to be 
calculated by the employer separately for each employee based on the employees accumulated 
income for the year. For individual entrepreneurs, the tax rates will range from a high of 35.6% 
on income below 100,000 roubles to a low of 2% on income above 600,000 roubles. Employers 
will generally pay less total tax under the UST than they currently pay to the non-budgetary 
social funds. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Financial Resources for Regional Development: Co-operative and Competitive Models. The International Experience 
 an Example for Russia? DIW Discussion Papers No. 220, Berlin 2000. 
12 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 26.1.2001, published on the internet at: http://www.securities.co.uk; Chmelev, 
Alexander / Astakhov, Evgeny: Part Two of the Russian Federation Tax Code, in: BISNIS, 10.8.2000, published on 
the internet at: http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/COUNTRY/000818rstxcde2.htm 
13 For an overview, see Cochrane, Ian / Gidirim, Vladimir / Carty, Tim / Dobritskaia, Zhanna: The Russian Tax Sys-
tem. Achievements in 2000 and the Possible Agenda for 2001, in: Russian Economic Trends, 3/2000, pp. 17-19; 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6.10.2000. 
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Table 2: The Unified Social Tax 
Tax rate for the employer (organisations and 
enterprises) 
The income fund (the employees annual 
salary) 
35.6% Below 100,000 roubles 
20.0% 100,001 to 300,000 roubles 
10.0% 300,001 to 600,000 roubles 
2.0%* Above 600,000 roubles 
* Until 1 January 2002, the rate was 5.0%. 
Table 3: Distribution of the Unified Social Tax rate of 35.6% 
Pension Fund 28.0% 
Social Insurance Fund 4.0% 
Mandatory Health Insurance Fund 3.6% 
TOTAL 35.6% 
Source for Table 2 and 3: Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Global Tax Bulletin, 10.8.2000, published on the internet at: 
http://www.taxnews.com/ 
This regressive scale is designed to encourage companies to accurately report salaries paid to 
employees. Therefore, it is evident that it will be preferable, at least in terms of raw mathemat-
ics, to pay staff compensation as remuneration through the payroll. Many organisations (includ-
ing foreign companies) have underreported the salaries of employees in order to reduce the pay-
outs into social funds.14 An additional benefit is the fact that a single monthly remuneration will 
replace the current system where each of the four funds requires its own calculation and pay-
ment. This is widely considered to be a positive step in terms of transparency within the Russian 
economy as a whole, and specifically in the labour market. 
Although this all sounds fairly simple and straightforward, certain transition regulations have 
been introduced, which employers planning to opt for the new social security regime will have 
to satisfy. In order to qualify for the new regressive contribution scale, the average level of 
compensation to all employees of a company or organization must have exceeded 25,000 rou-
bles for the last six months of 2000. The top 30% of employees  (in terms of salary) will be 
ignored in calculating the average. For organizations with more than 30 employees, the remu-
neration of the top 10% will be ignored. This means that in order to qualify for the regressive 
scale, an organization will have to prove that it paid an average level of compensation in excess 
of approximately 160 US$ per month in the second half of 2000. In economic terms many em-
ployers would satisfy this test. However, where any of the alternative schemes were used, the 
level of income paid as remuneration may have been less than this figure. These organizations 
need to look carefully at their payroll, and need to raise averages by increasing salaries paid to 
staff.15 
If regressive rates do not apply, social fund contributions should be paid at 35.6%. These anti-
avoidance rules might slow down the process of employers declaring salaries in full, as bene-
fits from truthfully declaring salaries in 2001 will, in certain cases, arise only a year later, de-
pending of course on the extent to which salaries are being understated in 2000. However, bear-
                                                     
14 Estimation by Pricewaterhouse Coopers: Global Tax Bulletin, 10.8.2000, published on the internet at: 
http://www.taxnews.com 
15 Kogtev, Iurii: Far-reaching Tax Reform in Russia, in: Russia/Central Europe Executive Guide, 15.1.2001. 
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ing in mind the relatively small amounts of remuneration this might not become a crucial issue 
for most companies but could discourage employers with large numbers of employees with 
relatively low salaries from adopting transparent structures. 
It was expected that the introduction of the UST would clarify the applicability of Russian so-
cial security to foreigners. However, this remains a rather grey area of the legislation. Apart 
from the Pension Fund which specifically declared that Russian pensions are not applicable to 
foreigners (with the exception of those permanently residing in Russia and certain CIS citizens) 
none of the social security funds have made a clear statement whether or not foreign citizens 
have the right to use Russian state medical and social insurance. 
Public Opinion 
The UST was widely discussed in public within the context of the overall debate and the draft-
ing of part two of the new Tax Code, in spring 2000.16 On the eve of the Duma vote, both the 
government and the presidential administration believed that the deputies would pass a more 
conservative form of the bill. However, on the last day, leaders of the budget committee started 
to persuade the Duma factions that a compromise would deprive the tax reform of any meaning. 
Tax cuts would not reach a critical level, and enterprises would continue no to report salaries 
accurately.17 Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko, supported by trade union leader 
Mikhail Shmakov, Head of the Pension Fund Mikhail Zurabov, and Head of the Presidential 
Administration Alexander Voloshin, insisted on a bill which would allow the Pension Fund to 
stay independent for the next two years. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Kudrin, Finance Minis-
try officials, and the Minister of Economic Development German Gref wanted the bill to be 
more radical, but at the same time were afraid of a conflict with the Prime Minister. Prime Min-
ister Mikhail Kasyanov was interested in the most advanced form of the bill, but he had to take 
the opinion of the Presidential Administration into account.18 
During the process of the drafting of the new Tax Code and immediately after its publication, 
Trade Union members all over the country gathered for protests and rallies  for the first time in 
many years. The main argument of the unions was that there is no guarantee that the state will 
actually allocate all the sums collected to the social funds. Also, the distribution in their respec-
tive proportions would not be not secured. They demanded that the Federal Authorities should 
stop any changes in the social sphere, which will lead to restrictions and the abolition of already 
miserable social guarantees.19 A similar criticism came from international unions, for example 
the 200-million-members strong World Industrial Union. They claimed that the social tax would 
lead to insufficient funding of pensions, of benefits in the case of unemployment or temporary 
incapacity to work, of treatment in sanatoria, and of medical care for children.20 In their opinion, 
it seemed unacceptable to put the burden of social expenditure on the shoulders of workers, 
especially at a time when one third of the Russian population is living below the poverty line. 
They called on the Russian government to consult properly with the countrys unions on the 
                                                     
16 Since then, discussions have shifted and now concentrate on policy-making circles, government agencies and 
research institutions. 
17 Duma vote on tax reform brings surprises, in: WPS  Russian Political Monitor, 16.6.2000; television interview 
with Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov on Zerkalo RTR, published in CentreInvest  Russian Market Weekly, 
13.6.2000. 
18 Vedomosti, 14.6. 2000. 
19 Kovalev, Vladimir: Suspicion greets tax law changes, in: Russian Economic Barometer, 6.10.2000; The Union 
Messenger, Information Bulletin on the Labour Movement in Russia, July-August 2000; Russia economy: Tax 
reforms, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 12.6.2000; Russian Communists oppose government-proposed tax 
reforms, BBC Monitoring, source: NTV Moscow, 7.6.2000. 
20 International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers Unions (ICEM) at a meeting in Brus-
sels, May 2000. ICEM Update 53/2000. 
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issue, in order to come up with an equitable social security system that will guarantee the fund-
ing of these essential social benefits for workers and their families. 
Other arguments against the UST came from pensioners who have been frightened into believ-
ing that their meagre pay cheques will no longer arrive once the social security taxes are chan-
nelled through the budget rather than specialised funds. The communist party backed this argu-
ment. Furthermore, they did not agree to mandatory payments for health and education, and that 
the only solution to the pension problem is the transition to a fund-based pension-entitlement.21 
As will be described in the section Current Discussions and Plans, the fiercest opposition 
came from the non-budgetary funds, in particular the Pension Fund. In recent years these funds 
have become powerful, independent institutions, which have been able to block any attempts to 
meddle with their charges. They accepted the new system only after the government promised 
them that not much would change, apart from the fact that social taxes would from now on be 
channelled through the federal budget and then passed on to the non-budgetary funds.22 
Economic analysts and enterprises generally assessed the reform positively.23 Business 
representatives liked the idea of an all in one-option for making their payments. In the past 
they had to deal with the bureaucracy of four different administrations, as well as with the 
Federal Ministries, just to pay their payroll taxes. A number of analysts expected that 
channelling the social payments through the federal budget would allow the government to keep 
the non-budgetary funds on a short leash and reduce payments where money was wasted. 
                                                     
It is clear that the reform of social security contributions is primarily intended to bring more 
transactions into the open, with the further intention of simplifying tax collection and encourag-
ing both employers and employees to be tax compliant. In unifying the social taxes, the gov-
ernment is trying to make the social funds more transparent and less powerful. 
The introduction of the UST goes hand in hand with wider reform discussions in the field of 
social security, and certainly effects decision-making in this important policy field. The social 
tax is a new way of collecting and distributing social security contributions  nothing more, but 
also nothing less. The wider implications for social policy implementation will be discussed in 
the following chapters. 
Specific Social Policy Fields 
The creation of social funds in Russia dates back to 1991: pensions, medical insurance, unem-
ployment insurance and welfare. They were independent of the general state budget; the states 
role was simply to make sure that the enterprises paid. The total enterprise contributions to the 
various funds were set at 38.6% of the wage bill (pensions  28%, health insurance  3.6%, 
unemployment  1.6%, welfare  5.4%). In addition, 1% of income tax was passed to the Pen-
sion Fund. Until 1993, these funds were under the supervision of parliament, which, in response 
to the galloping inflation, voted to index pensions.24 
The adoption of the new tax code, under which social payments are defined as a tax, is a first 
step to reintegrating the social funds into the general budget. A new system of individual ac-
counts will be phased in, whereby 2% of a workers wages will be paid into a personal pension 
21 Press conference with the Foundation Politika, in: Federal News Service, 16.6.2000. 
22 Country briefing: Russian economy  Tax reform, in: Economist Intelligence Unit, 12.6.2000. 
23 McChesney, Andrew: Streamlined Social Taxation Gets Approval of Business, in: Economist Intelligence Unit, 
27.7.2000. 
24 In the Soviet Union, social spending was part of the state budget, while the unions disbursed the money. For an 
overview over the Soviet social system see: Connor, Walter: Social Policy under Communism, in: Kapstein, Ethan / 
Mandelbaum, Michael (eds.): Sustaining the Transition: The Social Safety Net in Postcommunist Europe, New York 
1997, pp. 10-45. 
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account, starting from 2002. New laws on medical and social insurance programmes are being 
drafted and are to be approved by the cabinet. There will be a transition period of one to two 
years, and the new programme will start in 2003.  
The impact of the new contribution system on social reform in general as well as the wider pol-
icy discussions will be examined in more detail on the next pages. We will concentrate on three 
sectors: pensions, health and employment, as these are the fields which are directly affected by 
the new method of collection/distribution of social contributions. 
Reform of the Pension System (Gesa Walcher) 
Despite a dramatic decline in life expectancy over the past decade, the proportion of the elderly 
among Russias population is increasing rapidly  pensioners make up more than a quarter of 
the Russian population, and this proportion is growing. Currently, the relation pensioner-worker 
is 1:1.4. These demographic developments are overwhelming the discussion of the countrys 
current pension system and prompting leading experts to call for its overhaul.25 
Although the ageing of populations is straining social security systems all over Europe and eco-
nomic theory on old age pensioning and studies of pension policy are a growing industry, the 
crisis in Russia seems to be most acute. With 8% of GDP spent on retirement, disability, and 
widespread occupational privileges,26 demographic forecasts indicate that without a reform 
those expenditures will have to increase to about 25% of GDP in 2050.27 With a sharp decline in 
the number of economically active citizens as compared with the number of pensioners, the 
simple distribution of insurance premiums  as is being done today  will cause a reduction in 
the sum received by each pensioner. However, according to current legislation the average pen-
sion is tied to average wages throughout the country. In other words, there will be less money, 
but the same amount will have to be paid out. In about eight years, the ratio of pensioners to 
workers will reach that critical value after which the Pension Fund budget will inevitably go 
into deficit. This will lead to a collapse of the state pension system. 
Many experts involved in the reform of the Russian pension system concluded from the Chilean 
and most other Latin American experiences of the 1980ies28 that a comprehensive pension re-
                                                     
25 According to current projections, one third of the population will reach pensionable age in five to seven years. See 
interview with Labour Minister Aleksandr Pochinok, Demographic Decline Almost Irreversible, Intercon Daily 
Report on Russia, 17.5.2001. For an overview of statistics and impact on the demographic crisis, see: Goskomstat: 
Quarterly Statistical Reports, published on the internet at: http://www.securities.co.uk, 30.12.1999; Vassin, Sergei A.: 
The Determinants and Implications of an Ageing Population in Russia, in: DaVanzo, Julie / Farnsworth, Gwendolyn 
(eds.): Russias Demographic Crisis. Conference Report, RAND, CF-124-CRES, Santa Monica 1996, published on 
the internet at: http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF124/CF124.chap6.html; Nivorozhkina, Ludmila: Living 
Standard of the Russian Pensioners and Pension System, in: Stropnik, Nada (ed.): Social and Economic Aspects of 
Ageing Societies, Lyjublyana 1997, pp. 195-211. 
26 Around 38 million people in Russia receive pension benefits, however, only half of them (around 20 million) are 
actually above retirement age. Sinyavskaya, Oksana: Chelovek i gosudarstvo v rossiiskoi pensionnoi sisteme, in: Pro 
et Contra 6/2001, pp. 46-62, here: p. 58, published on the internet at: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/p&c/Vol6-2001/3/v6n3-
03.pdf 
27 Healey, Thomas: Russias Uniquely Enormous and Complex Problem, in: Pensions International, April 2000, 
http://www.pensionsinternational.co.uk; Kapstein, Ethan / Milanovic, Branko: Dividing Transition Gains and Losses: 
Pensions, Privatization, and Reform in Russia, in: Transition, 1/2000, pp. 4-7; Vittas, Dimitri / Michelitsch, Roland: 
Pension Funds in Central Europe and Russia. Their Prospects and Potential Role in Corporate Governance, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1459, Washington 1995. 
28 Following an invitation by Presidential Advisor Andrei Illarionov to Moscow in April 2001, the chief architect of 
the Chilean reform, Jose Pinera, started a discussion about the Chilenian reform as a model for Russia  the social 
security system now in place in Russia is the same Chile had until the 1980s. Pinera is of the opinion that the chief 
obstacle for implementing a Chilean style reform in Russia is employers lack of trust of the domestic financial sys-
tem. He argues that Russia needs to copy Chiles free market economic reforms if it is to emerge from its Communist 
past  Russias pay-as-you-go pension system should be replaced with a system of personal retirement accounts 
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form  as opposed to merely improving the existing system  has to start by replacing the cur-
rent monopoly of the pay-as-you-go system (with pensions paid out of tax revenues) by a 
combination of a fully funded, mandatory contribution system with voluntary, private funded 
schemes.29 As they embark on systemic reform, the key issues to be addressed by Russia are the 
relative size and functions of the public and private pillars that will evolve from the reform 
process, and the speed of the transition to the financial pension system. 
Main Shortcomings of the Current Pension System 
Russia currently operates a pay-as-you-go pension system: The younger generation sponsors 
the elder. Contributions made by those in employment are immediately paid out as benefits to 
pensioners. This system requires companies to transfer 28% of their wage bill and individual 
workers 1% of their salary to the Pension Fund. Pension transfers in Russia support 38.5 million 
pensioners. Due to revenue shortfalls, the centrally managed Pension Fund has been in a deep-
ening fiscal crisis since 1995. Falling output, tax evasion, and tax offsets at the enterprise level 
have repeatedly forced the Pension Fund to cut or even suspend pension payments. As a result 
of the fiscal crisis, and despite periodic upward revisions, there has been a steady erosion of 
pensions vis-à-vis subsistence needs. In late 1998 pension arrears amounted to 30.5 billion rou-
bles (at that time about 1.1 billion US$).30 
The inadequacies and defects of the current pension system can be summed up as follows:31 
High contribution rates and weak compliance 
Poor collection of contributions has led to arrears in the payment of benefits. The pension sys-
tem is replenished from the budget if it runs into a deficit. Employees direct contributions are 
either zero or minimal. As successful collection depends heavily on the employers tax burden, 
this encourages managers to evade tax by under-reporting their payroll. The gap between offi-
cial and actual contribution rates, coupled with other budgetary problems, explains the current 
shortfall in pensions 
                                                                                                                                                           
invested in real economic assets like stocks and bonds. Pinera, Jose: A Chilenian Model for Russia, in: Foreign Af-
fairs, 5/2000, pp. 62-73. 
29 Recent studies on the reform of the Russian pension system: Cashu, Ilean: The New Politics of Pension Retrench-
ment in Russia, New York 2000 (draft); Denisova, Irina / Gorban, Maria / Iudaeva, Ksenia: Social Policy in Russia: 
Pension Fund and Social Security, in: Russian Economic Trends, 1/1999, pp. 12-23; Cook, Linda: The Impact of 
Globalization and Liberalization on the Russian Welfare State, Providence 1999 (draft); Vasin, S. / Gontmakher, E. / 
Dmitriev, M. et al: Pensionnaya Reforma v Rossii: Prichiny, soderzhanie, perspektivy, St. Petersburg 1998; Charlton, 
Roger / McKinnon, Roddy / Konopielko, Lukasz: Pensions Reform, Privatisation and Restructuring in the Transition: 
Unfinished Business or Inappropriate Agendas?, in: Europe Asia Studies 8/1998, pp. 1413-1446; Castello Branco, 
Marta de: Pension Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and other Countries of the Former Soviet Union (BRO), IMF Work-
ing Paper WP/98/11, Washington 1998 published on the internet at: http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/wp/wp9811.pdf; Fox, Louise: Pension Reform in the Post-Communist Transition Economies, in: Nelson, Joan 
/ Tilly, Charles / Walker, Lee (eds.): Transforming Post-Communist Political Economies, Washington 1997, pp. 370-
384; Udodova, Svetlana: On the Strategy of the Implementation of the Pension System in Russia, in: Stropnik, Nada 
(ed.): Social and economic aspects of ageing societies: An Important Social Development Issue, Lyublyana 1997, pp. 
214-218; Mikhalev, Vladimir: Social Security in Russia under Economic Transformation, in: Europe-Asia Studies 
1/1996, pp. 5-25; Vittas, Dimitri / Michelitsch, Roland: Pension Funds in Central Europe and Russia. Their Prospects 
and Potential Role in Corporate Governance, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1459, Washington 
1995. 
30 Kapstein, Ethan / Milanovich, Branko: Russia badly needs pension reform, in: Transition Newsletter, The World 
Bank Group 1/2000. 
31 Spravochnik sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy Rossii: Istoki krizisa pensionnoi sistemy (glava 10), published 
on the internet at: http://fiper.ru/spr/chapter-10-1.html; Nussberger, Angelika: Eine neue Etappe in der Reform des 
russischen Rentensystems, in: Deutsche Rentenversicherung 6-7/1999, pp. 406-414. 
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Missing link between salaries and benefits 
There is no direct link between salaries earned, pension payments made and benefits ultimately 
received. As the amount of contributions does not directly influence the amount of benefit, there 
is no incentive for employees to work more effectively and receive better salaries. Many Rus-
sians see this system as another state tax and feel they have little to benefit from participating in 
it and little incentive to save for retirement. 
Unfavourable demographic trends 
The share of pensioners in the overall population is 19% and rising. Between 1959 and 1990, 
the proportion of the population aged 60 and above doubled. From 2010, Russia is expected to 
see a dramatic increase in the number of pensioners while the working population will be de-
creasing. The retirement age is 55 for women and 60 for men, which is extremely low compared 
to international retirement standards. While specialists recognise that because the population is 
becoming older the retirement age should be increased, politicians refuse to consider this possi-
bility  one reason for that is the extremely low life expectancy of the Russian population. The 
average life expectancy fell to 65.5 years in 1999, according to a report presented by the Rus-
sian Academy of Medical Science. The rate for men was 59.9 years, while the average life ex-
pectancy for women was 72 years.32 
Reform 2000/2001: The Introduction of a Mandatory Funded System 
The government has long been committed to the move from the current pay-as-you-go pen-
sion system to a funded three-tier system of pension provision including a basic state pension, a 
state earnings-related pension and a supplementary pension financed by voluntary contributions 
to private pension funds. At a government meeting in September 2000, which reviewed the fi-
nancial background to the pension proposals, the economic and financial outlook was judged 
favourable. The basic proposal for the new system was put forward on 5 October 2000. 
The shape of the reforms is based broadly on the document drafted by a previous administration 
in May 1998. Though the final proposals look likely to be less ambitious than the May 1998 
blueprint, some details are becoming clearer. The system will consist of three pillars: 
• The first pillar in the form of a publicly financed pay-as-you-go system, designed 
to provide an income floor for all elderly persons (as described above); 
• A second pillar with mandatory earnings-related programs, which in turn would be 
fully or at least partly capitalised (as described below); 
• A third pillar with voluntary earnings-related pension regimes, which, in the long 
run, should be fully capitalised (as described below). 
The second pillar: Earnings-related pensions 
Currently, the working assumption is that funds will start to be set aside for the mandatory sec-
ond pillar in the near future.33 Who will manage the funds and what securities it will be allowed 
to invest in remains unclear. One of the suggested options is that they will be kept centrally on 
one account opened at, for example, the Central Bank of Russia. The Pension Fund will invest 
these funds through investment companies and the interest accrued will be reflected on each 
                                                     
32 Life expectancy falls again, in: The Russia Journal, 28.10.2000. See also: DaVanzo, Julie / Adamson, David: 
Russias Demographic Crisis: How real is it?, in: RAND Issue Paper July 1997, published on the internet at: 
http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP162/ 
33 Originally, the beginning of 2002 was envisaged, using 100 billion roubles left over by the Pension Fund from 
1999. Zubarev, Leonid / McKenna, Cameron: Emerging Legislation for New Russian System, in: Pensions Interna-
tional, February 2001, published on the internet at: http://www.pensionsinternational.co.uk 
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individual account.34 The government will have to try to avoid the high costs of the second pil-
lar which were caused. for example, by the implementation of the system in Poland, as a result 
of the competition of funds leading to an increased administrative burden and marketing costs. 
The goal of the reform is to split the current pension contribution of 28%, setting aside one half 
to pay the minimum pension, and the other half for pension accumulation. Employers will pay 
2% of their employees wages into superannuation accounts. This share will be raised to 9% by 
2009. Employee contributions of 1% are due to be abolished. All information regarding an em-
ployee, his salary and contributions made by the employer will be kept on an individual notional 
account  an electronic document that will be a modified version of the already existing person-
alised data recording system run by the State Pension Fund.35 
Participation in the second pillar will be mandatory for all new entrants to the labour force and 
for all male workers born in 1950 or later and female workers born in 1955 or later. For older 
workers it will be voluntary. As currently planned, young workers would have to transfer some 
6% of their salaries, while older workers may only have to contribute 2%. The redistribution 
system will remain, but its share will decrease. It could possibly become a minimum pension 
guaranteed by the government.  
According to Minister of Labour Aleksandr Pochinok, first payments out of the savings system 
will be made in 2010. The amount will, of course, depend on the general state of the domestic 
economy but, according to the best-case scenario, by 2010 the average additional benefit re-
ceived from the savings system could be equal to 12% of the average pension. By 2025 funded 
pensions could be equal to or higher than the state pay-as-you-go payment.36 However, the 
government acknowledges the right to return to the distribution system in case economic condi-
tions worsen  establishing the funded pillar will inevitably leave less money to pay for the exist-
ing pay-as-you-go state scheme. The hope is that economic growth, depending on the world 
oil price, will expand the surplus of the state fund to the point where most or all of the contribu-
tions to the second pillar can be paid out of the surplus.37 
The third pillar: Voluntary contributions to private pension funds 
Safeguards and investment opportunities for private pension funds are one of the critical issues 
for Russia. Russian institutions have a poor record of managing the populations savings. More-
over, the potential to conservatively invest pension money in growing sectors of the Russian 
economy is limited. 
At present only 260,000 pensioners receive payments from private funds  although more than 
2.5 million Russians participate in them.38 Private funds pay 107 roubles per month on average, 
or 25% on top of the average 580 roubles state pension. At the same time, the official subsis-
tence minimum for pensioners is set by government decree at 851 roubles (30 US$). Corporate 
pension funds, which are the strongest element of a private pension system, can afford payments 
dozens of times higher than the state rate. Major corporate funds, which account for only 15% 
of the countrys private funds, hold 93% of all assets and 65% of its clients. Indeed, during 
1999, they tripled their own funds and invested more than 11 billion roubles into the economy. 
The corporate funds of Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom, which are among the largest, indi-
                                                     
34 Turf War Hinders Progress, in: Pensions International, April 2001, published on the internet at: 
http://www.pensionsinternational.co.uk 
35 Zubarev, Leonid / McKenna, Cameron: Emerging Legislation for New Russian System, in: Pensions International, 
February 2001, published on the internet at: http://www.pensionsinternational.co.uk 
36 Izvestiya, 6.2.2001. 
37 Kommersant", 7.2.2001. 
38 On private pension funds in Russia see: WPS  The Russian Finance Report, 20.4.2001, published on the internet 
at: http://www.securities.co.uk; Petrosian, Kristine: Pensions Overhaul Shapes Up, in: The Russia Journal, 1.7.2000. 
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cate that the growth rate is most impressive for the funds related to the most promising sectors 
of the economy. However, most company pension funds are reinvesting the money into them-
selves. Surgutneftegaz, for one, has used its pension fund to buy 40% of its own stock, some-
thing that would not be allowed in the West. The other big two  Lukoil and Gazprom  are 
following suit. Between them, these three companies account for about half of the assets in pen-
sion funds.39  
Since the beginning of 2001, 11 new funds were registered; according to Andrei Mudrakov, 
Head of the Private Pension Funds Revision Committee, several foreign banks and companies 
have shown interest in organising such funds in Russia.40 
Current Discussions and Plans 
In February 2001, President Vladimir Putin initiated the creation of the National Council for 
Pension Reform, to be led by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.41 The purpose of the Council is 
to lead a public debate about the pension reform plans and try to achieve a consensus between 
the various government agencies with differing ideas on the nature and speed of reform. Two of 
the leading proponents of reform are Mikhail Zurabov, Head of the State Pension Fund and 
Mikhail Dmitriev, Deputy Minister for Economic Development and Trade and main promoter 
of the pension reform. A number of working groups have been set up to discuss the details of 
the reform, such as the legal, budgetary and investment issues. Although the exact membership 
of the Council has not been published, it is at the highest level and includes the Prime Minister 
and heads of government departments and the State Pension Fund.42 
The Turf War between the Pension Fund and Ministry of Economy 
As the introduction of the UST has drastically reduced the influence of the State Pension Fund  
one of the most powerful financial institutions in Russia  by depriving it of the responsibility 
for collecting pension contributions, it is now anxious to recover some of its former eminence 
within the reform debate. The Pension Fund concept proceeds from the traditional Soviet prin-
ciple of a unified fund, although it makes provisions for organisation of a reserve fund to make 
a transition to the individual system easier in the future. It wants the transition period to the new 
three-pillar system to be drawn out over 20 years so as to retain its powerful position as the pro-
vider of the first pillar pay-as-you-go system for as long as possible. At certain points in the 
debate it has argued against having any mandatory funded pillar at all and has pressed instead 
the virtues of a national defined contribution system. Moreover, one version of its proposals 
argued against the introduction of individual accounts.43 
Ranged against the Pension Fund is a group of reformers within the government, headed by the 
Ministry of Economy, which wants to stop the Pension Fund regaining any of its old authority. 
It argues that the reform should take a more conventional path along the route of international 
experience. This means individual accounts (payments by each employee to the Pension Fund 
should be transferred to a personal account, as a result of which these savings will be strictly 
connected to the owner), individual choice and private sector managers. According to Mikhail 
                                                     
39 However, most company pension funds are reinvesting the money into themselves. Surgutneftegaz, for one, has 
used its pension fund to buy 40% of its own stock, something that would not be allowed in the West. The other big 
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assets in pension funds. Kristine Petrosian: Pension overhaul shapes up, in: The Russia Journal, 1.7.2000. 
40 Petrosian, Kristine: Pensions Overhaul Shapes Up, in: The Russia Journal, 1.7.2000. 
41 Putin Sets Up National Council for Pension Reform, in: Pensions International, March 2001, published on the 
internet at: http://www.pensionsinternational.co.uk 
42 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6.3.2001. 
43 Turf War Hinders Progress, in: Pensions International, April 2001, published on the internet at: 
http://www.pensionsinternational.co.uk 
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Dmitriev, superannuation funds should be invested in the most promising sectors of the Russian 
economy. If this is done, the government will receive an interest-free loan from its citizens. 
Dmitriev also speaks about the possible attraction of foreign companies for international diver-
sification of the assets of the accumulating element of the Russian Pension Fund.44 
The Question of Pension Management and Financing 
The main problem connected with the creation of a pension fund is where to invest the assets in 
order to achieve security and a return above the rate of inflation. Various options have been 
considered but it is generally recognised that at present there is no investment instrument or 
institution within Russia which would secure the savings of millions of people. 
There are similar problems with regard to insurance and the investment of reserves. Being 
commercial organisations, insurance companies are subject to the usual tax treatment. In addi-
tion, according to the recent changes in tax legislation re-insurance premiums on life policies 
paid by Russian insurance companies to foreign reinsures are not tax deductible as from 1 Janu-
ary 2001. As non-profit organisations, pension funds enjoy a less onerous tax regime. But while 
there are about 1,400 insurance companies in Russia, the number of pension funds is far smaller 
and nearly all have been established only to provide pension benefits for employees of a major 
enterprise or an industry as a whole.45 
This balance between tax treatment of premiums paid to insurance companies and contributions 
to pension funds has been in dispute since the first pension fund was established. At present, an 
employer may attribute to the cost of production (i.e. deduct them from taxes) contributions 
made to a pension fund or life insurance premiums paid to an insurance company in an amount 
not exceeding 1% of the gross salary per year. The draft legislation prepared by the government 
provides that employers will be able to deduct contributions to pension funds in an amount not 
exceeding 9% of the gross salary per year while life insurance premiums will be deductible if 
they do not exceed 2,000 roubles per person per year.46 However, insurance companies are lob-
bying for the introduction of similar tax treatment for life insurance premiums. 
Implementation: Problems and Risks 
A number of issues arise which may defer the implementation of the new system. The advan-
tages of the new pension system are evident, but the difficulties connected with applying this 
system are no less obvious. 
Coverage 
Unfavourable demographic trends will soon lead to a 1:1 ratio between workers and pensioners: 
the present pension system will not work in such a situation. At the same time, if the superannu-
ation system starts working, the size of the pension payments will depend on each individuals 
income  rather than on the present complicated system of coefficients. Indexing pensions to the 
average wage is an alternative to the planned pension reform; but this would lead to shortfalls in 
the Pension Funds budget, which could only be covered by extra state funding. It is clear that 
citizens with low incomes will not be able to save enough over 20 years to guarantee themselves 
acceptable living standards after retirement. The architects of the reform hope that those who 
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receive the greater part of their income off the books will demand that their employers legal-
ise their wages. 
The mandatory system will be effective only if the economy keeps growing steadily. Only 
economy growth  to be precise: the world oil price  will make it possible for the Pension Fund 
to maintain pension payments despite cuts in the social tax. These cuts are also complicated: in 
reducing the social tax by 1% per year, the government will have to obtain the Dumas approval 
each time. 
Participation 
While many Russian people realise that the state will not provide adequately for them in retire-
ment, fewer are willing or able to put away additional contributions towards retirement. Histori-
cally, the Russian people generally do not trust financial institutions. However, they might trust 
a well-regarded international bank or insurance company if it were to enter this market and set 
up an insurance company or a pension fund. As regards private pension funds, there is no com-
petition from major international players at the moment. 
Funds and Investment 
Monitoring the money of the Pension Fund is another problem. The architects of the reform face 
a difficult task. They have to find reliable financial tools, which will guarantee an interest rate 
higher than inflation. Currently the government does not have such tools: neither short-term 
treasury bills (GKO, Gosudarstvennoe kratkosrochnoe obyazatel'stvo), nor other securities guar-
antee a high and stable return. In short, there is nothing to invest the funds into. Russian private 
funds mostly played the speculative stock market, which conflicts with the main principle of 
private funds  conservatism. 
Furthermore, local financial markets would not be able to cope with the inflow of money from a 
funded system. The alternative of investing some of the money abroad is not viewed positively, 
according to Elena Zotova of the World Banks Moscow office, not least because politicians 
find it difficult to argue that savings should be invested abroad when they are promoting funded 
pensions partly as a way of channelling capital into the national economy.47 Mikhail Dmitriev 
thinks 20-25 % of the Pension Funds money must be invested in foreign financial assets to 
achieve reasonable portfolio diversification.48 This would require new legislation, as Russian 
law currently does not allow the movement of pension funds abroad. There is no such antipathy 
to the participation of foreign fund managers in the reformed Russian system  only some doubt 
as to whether many will want to.  
Operation 
Another key issue is the monitoring of individual contributions. It is unclear who is going to 
maintain individual records of career history and earning levels. Administrative costs will nec-
essarily have to increase. So far there are few details of the investment policies which the fund 
will be expected to pursue. The Federal Securities Committee (FSC)49 sees the need for a strong 
regulatory framework to protect assets from fraud and theft. Vladimir Milovidov, an FSC com-
mittee member, stated that in other countries depositary fees are calculated on the basis of the 
assets of a fund, while the committee suggested fees should depend on the return on the funds 
assets. The only persons holding claims to the asset would be the account holders, creditors and 
brokers would have no claims.50 
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Evaluation 
The development of a new concept for the pension system in Russia is an original one insofar as 
neither existing pension models of Western industrial countries nor suggestions of World Bank 
and IMF seem to play a great role in current policy making. Although negative experiences of 
other countries which apply the multi-pillar approach might seem to get a raw deal in the ap-
proach, the overall impression is of an intensive and balanced discussion  the direction and 
main ideas of the reform seem to have remained rather unchanged for the last years, despite 
changes in leadership. 
At the moment, however, the concept of the pension system in Russia is no more than that  a 
lot of questions remain to be answered, many concrete problems are unsolved. Whether the 
government will get political backing for the implementation of the reform plans or not will 
depend on the overall political and especially the economic developments within the next 
months and years. As the pension reform is, at the same time, a factor which can heavily deter-
mine these developments, and as the majority of todays pensioners (voters) will not benefit 
from the changes under discussion, it remains to be seen if the trust in the policy makers is high 
enough to back the changes to come. 
Health Reform: No Rouble for a Deficient System (Susanne Nies) 
Overview: The Russian health system and its Legacies 
The Russian health system was established in the late 19th century as a huge network of provin-
cial medical stations and hospitals free of charge. The victorious communists decreed free 
medical care for the entire population. Thus, Russia set up the first universal, centralized and 
state-controlled health care system. Soviet medicine was not preventive medicine but patient 
care. Efficiency was measured only in terms of quantity: the number of beds in hospitals and the 
bed-day ratio where considered to be the basic indicators.51 This lead and leads to significant 
misallocations: 65% of state-expenditures on public health are allocated to hospitals. A more 
sophisticated system, covering cities and the countryside, providing small- and large-scale ser-
vices has to be introduced in order to raise efficiency. 
The Status Quo 
The dramatic decline of public health in the Russian Federation and the CIS countries can 
hardly be overestimated. Life expectancy has decreased sharply.52 Indicator diseases such as 
tuberculosis and diphtheria have re-emerged, and AIDS has spread.53 Infant mortality at birth is 
                                                     
51 Vocatch-Boldyrev, Igor, The promotion and privatisation of medical services in the Russian Federation, Ukraine 
and Georgia. ILO Working Paper IPPRED-15, 2000, published on the internet at: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/ent/papers/ippred15.htm and Rozenfeld, Boris A.: The Crisis of Rus-
sian Health Care and Attempts at Reform, Moscow 2001. 
52 Life-expectancy has been decreasing for decades, but dramatically so since the beginning of the transition period: 
men live on average only to the age of 60 as a result of alcoholism, industrial accidents and heart diseases. Womens 
life-expectancy is at 72 years six to eight years below Western levels. According to Labour Minister Pochinok Russia 
has been facing a steady unprecedented population decline since 1992, the population decreasing by 750.000 people 
per year. 
 Interview with Labour Minister Alexander Pochinok in Moskovsky Komsomolets, 17.5.2001. Tat'yana Maleva 
attributes responsibility to long-term developments for the last thirty years, i.e., since Soviet times. See: Vyshnevsky, 
Anatoly / Shkol'nikov, Vladimir: Smertnost' v Rossii: glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety deistviya, Nauchnye doklady, 
Moskovsky tsentr Karnegi Vypusk 19, Moscow 1997, published on the internet at: 
http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/toc.asp and Shkol'nikov, V. / Andreev, E. / Maleva, T. (eds.): Neravenstvo i 
smertnost' v Rossii: kollektivnaya monografiya, Moscow 2000, published on the internet at: 
http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2000/02tm/ 
53 Velkova, A., / Wolleswinkel-Van den Bosch, J. H. / Mackenbach, J. P.: The East-West life expectancy gap: differ-
ences in mortality from conditions amenable to medical intervention. International Journal of Epidemiology 1/1997, 
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extremely high, whereas the birth rate has dropped to 1.1 children per family.54 The quality of 
services has been subject to serious deterioration in the countryside and in regions affected by 
the crisis.55 
Table 4: Life Expectancy in the USSR, Russia and selected European countries (1960/1990) 
Country Life-Expectancy in years 
 Men Women 
Infant mortality per 
1000 births 
 1960 1990 1960 1990 1960 1990 
Russia 63.6 63.8 71.8 74.2 36.6 17.6 
UK 67.9 72.9 73.7 78.5 22.5 7.9 
FRG 66.9 72.9 72.1 79.3 35.0 7.0 
Greece 67.3 74.6 72.4 78.5 40.1 9.7 
Spain 67.4 73.3 72.2 80.4 43.7 7.6 
Italy 72.3 80.1 72.3 80.1 43.9 8.2 
Portugal 61.2 70.4 66.8 77.4 77.5 10.9 
France 66.9 72.7 73.6 80.9 27.5 7.3 
Switzerland 71.2* 74.8 74.9* 80.4 16.6 6.0 
       
Soviet Union 65.3** 64.3 72.7** 73,9 35.3 21.8 
EC 67.5 72.8 72.7 79.4 34.5 7.6 
*1960-1964, ** 1960-61. 
Sources: Vyshnevsky, Anatoly / Shkol'nikov, Vladimir: Smertnost' v Rossii: glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety deist-
viya, Nauchnye doklady, Moskovsky tsentr Karnegi Vypusk 19, Moscow 1997, p. 11, using data from: Evolution 
démographique récente en Europe 1996, Conseil de lEurope, Strasbourg 1996, Eurostat 1996, Naselenie Rossii 
1996. This particular table is published on the internet at: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/9711tm-chp01.pdf 
The complete publication can be accessed via: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/toc.asp 
                                                                                                                                                           
pp. 75-84. Russia faces a return of indicator diseases as such as tuberculosis and diphtheria, due to insufficient health 
care and overcrowded and dirty prisons and dormitories in orphanages, barracks etc. Aids became a serious problem 
with 70,000 officially recognised infected persons in 2000: the WHO estimates the number to be ten times higher. 
Moskovsky Komsomolets, 17.5.2001. 
54 Moskovsky Komsomolets, 17.5.2001. The reproduction rate is 2.1 children per family. 
55 The propiska system is a handicap for people from the countryside: there is no access to public health care in cities, 
only via private funding. 
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Table 5: Life Expectancy in Russia 1987-1996 
Year Men and women Men Women 
1987 69.94 64.87 74.32 
1988 69.76 64.61 74.29 
1989 69.62 64.21 74.56 
1990 69.25 63.77 74.38 
1991 69.02 63.45 74.29 
1992 67.89 62.01 73.76 
1993 65.16 58.95 71.96 
1994 63.88 57.49 71.04 
1995 64.61 58.22 71.70 
1996 65.88 59.73 72.51 
Source: Vyshnevsky, Anatoly / Shkol'nikov, Vladimir: Smertnost' v Rossii: glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety 
deistviya, Nauchnye doklady, Moskovsky tsentr Karnegi Vypusk 19, Moscow 1997, p. 12, using data from: Evolu-
tion démographique récente en Europe 1996, Conseil de lEurope, Strasbourg 1996, Eurostat 1996, Naselenie Rossii 
1996. This particular table is published on the internet at: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/9711tm-chp01.pdf 
The complete publication can be accessed via: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/toc.asp 
The system suffers from lack of funding. Eastern European investment in public health is low 
compared to other industrialised countries. In addition, Russian medical staff are affected by the 
overall problem of unpaid leave. Bribes and poor quality of services are the consequence.56 The 
compensatory function of private health care is low, since only 5% of the population are cov-
ered.57 
Table 6: Expenditures on health care in the USSR, the USA and France 1960-1990 
Year Expenditures / per capita Growth since 1960 
 USSR 
(Roubles) 
USA 
(Dollars) 
France 
(Francs) 
USSR USA France 
1960 27 143 242 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1970 49 346 816 1.8 2.4 3.4 
1980 72 1064 3566 2.7 7.4 14.7 
1990 124 2601 9521 4.7 18.2 39.3 
Source: Vyshnevsky, Anatoly / Shkol'nikov, Vladimir: Smertnost' v Rossii: glavnye gruppy riska i prioritety 
deistviya, Nauchnye doklady, Moskovsky tsentr Karnegi Vypusk 19, Moscow 1997, p. 14, using data from: Narod-
noe khozyaistvo SSSR, Statistical Abstract of the US 1994, Washington 1994, p. 104, Annuaire rétrospectif de la 
France, Séries longues 1948-88, Paris 1990, p. 190. Annuaire statistique de la France, Paris 1995, p. 241. This parti-
cular table is published on the internet at: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/9711tm-chp01.pdf 
The complete publication can be accessed via: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/1997/11tm/toc.asp 
                                                     
56 Wage arrears for medical workers: only forty-three of 89 federal entities of the RF have no debts to medical work-
ers. In some parts wages have not been paid for a month. Arrears amounted to 488.9 million roubles in May 2001. 
BBC Monitoring 16.5.2001, published on the internet at: http://www.securities/ 
57 Cf. Annex: Interview with T. Maleva, 2.10.2001. 
22  Susanne Nies / Gesa Walcher  
A third problem of public healthcare in Russia is missing data and thus the absence of central 
coordination: one outstanding example is the absence of a database for stocks of blood bottles, 
donors organs or pharmaceuticals. 
Reforms since 1991: Meditsinskaya Sluzhba 
In the mainstream of the transition from Beveridge to Bismarck, an extra-budgetary health fund 
was set up in 1993: the so-called Meditsinskaya Sluzhba (Health-Insurance Fund).58 Similar to 
the other social policy funds, the fund consists of a central fund in Moscow and branch offices 
in the federal entities. Since the introduction of the UST, this fund is financed by 3.6% of the 
overall total of the social tax.59 But, as mentioned above, the problem is rather the funding side 
than the structure. For the latter, a fundamental reform is not yet in sight. The conservative Min-
istry of Health is more concerned with assessment than with policy-making. 
Evaluation: UST and Health care 
The most important point on the agenda is the transition to preventive health care. Once this 
reform is implemented, an essential increase in funding is necessary.60 The first step has to be an 
overall assessment, followed by basic and general reforms. Conservative resistance will be dif-
ficult to overcome. One possibility to flood the conservative system could be the setting-up of 
competing private health care, a public-private mix, and the redirection of hospital-shares to 
new institutions. 
Employment (Susanne Nies) 
Overview 
The Russian labour market was afflicted in the 1990ies by the following problems: 
Low wages and unpaid leave: 
The most important problem of the Russian labour market in the 1990ies was not so much un-
employment as low wages.61 Unpaid leave and wage arrears became a nightmare for millions of 
civil servants, in the army, public health, education and other services. There is a widespread 
fear that shrinking oil-prices could lead to a renewal of this experience. 
Victims of labour-market restructuring: 
Specific groups became victims of labour market restructuring in Russia: people related to the 
huge military-industrial complex, civil servants and refugees. Regional disparities due to the 
former division of labour among the countries of the CMEA or to climate and raw materials 
have an important impact on regional labour markets. 
                                                     
58 The 3.6% from enterprises, employers and employees put together were submitted to regional health-funds (3.4%), 
and, for fiscal redistribution, to the central Health Insurance Fund (0.2%). For details see: Rinck, Sabine: Lebensstan-
dard und soziale Sicherung, in: Höhmann, Hans-Herrmann / Schröder; Hans-Henning (eds.): Russland unter neuer 
Führung. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Münster 2001, pp. 159-169, here: p. 
167.The non-working population was within the jurisdiction of regional funds. This meant that regions with high 
unemployment had difficulties facing their social obligations. 
59 See section The UST: Facts and Figures of this paper: application of the regressive scale. 
60 Cf. Rozenfeld, Boris A.: The Crisis of Russian Health Care and Attempts at Reform, Moscow 2001. 
61 Working poor in the public sector. 
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Unemployment: 
Even if unemployment rates remain relatively low (8% in 1995, 12% 1999 and 8.5% in 2001),62 
the mental acceptance of the phenomenon was difficult for a country which had officially never 
experienced unemployment. 
The unofficial labour-market: 
An unofficial labour market emerged as well as alternative forms of revenues: both reveal tax-
evasion strategies. 
Reforms since 1991: The employment fund and its abolition in 2001 
The Employment fund and its abolition 
The Employment Funds (Fond zanyatosti) was established in July 1991 as a Department of the 
Labour Ministry. At the same time, an independent labour-market institute was set up, the tasks 
of which were research and publications on labour-market developments. Since 1998, both the 
Fund and the Institute have become a subject of permanent dispute between political fractions. 
The abolition of the controversial institutions in the context of the introduction of the UST 
therefore did not come as a surprise.63 From 1 January 2001 onwards the State-Employment 
Service and dependent regional employment services are financed directly from the federal 
budget. 
Immediate reactions were mostly sceptical. The Mayor of Moscow, Luzhkov, declared in No-
vember 2000 that his city would prefer to pay unemployment benefits itself. According to him, 
the governments intention of fully re-centralising labour market policy was an ill-considered 
mistake.64 Experts fear that fewer financial resources will be devoted to employment pro-
grammes, and that labour-market policy will be limited to unemployment-benefits. 
Evaluation 
The introduction of the regressive UST has had a positive effect on the downsizing and elimina-
tion of the parallel labour market. The regressive scale is an incitement to fully declare and raise 
revenues. On the other hand, small and medium-sized enterprises can be seriously hurt by the 
regressive scale, and therefore might engage in tax evasion. 
A further step in the direction of regulated labour relations is the adoption of a Labour Code.65 
Many, on the other hand, considered the closing-down of the Unemployment Fund and the In-
dependent Institute for Labour-Market Research to be a mistake. The position of the Ministry 
was reinforced, and labour market policy limited, at least for the moment, to unemployment-
benefits. 
                                                     
62 Rinck, Sabine: Lebensstandard und soziale Sicherung, in: Höhmann, Hans-Herrmann / Schröder; Hans-Henning 
(eds.): Russland unter neuer Führung. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Münster 
2001, pp. 159-169, here: p. 165. ITAR-Tass 20.4.2001: 6.85 Mio. Unemployed = 9.6 Percent of the working popula-
tion. (total working population in March 2001: 71.7 Mio.). The national labour force survey was suspended in 1998, 
to save money, thus abolishing the only source for the monitoring of unemployment. Kasyanov 30.11.01, published 
on the internet at: http://www.securities.co.uk/ 
63 The Ministry of Labour announced this decision on 13.10.2000. 
64 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Moscow mayor wants to pay unemployment benefits himself, 24.11.2000, published 
on the internet at: http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/ 
65 See: Kudyukin, P. M. / Maleva, T. M. / Misikhina, S. G. / Surkov, S. V.: Skol'ko stoit trudovoi kodeks?, Rabochie 
materialy Moskovskogo Tsentra Karnegi 3/2001, Moscow 2001, published on the internet at: 
http://pubs.carnegie.ru/workpapers/2001/wp0301.pdf 
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Findings 
Main changes 
A comparison of the Social Insurance System in Russia before and after the introduction of the 
UST shows the following features: 
 Before the introduction of 
UST (until 31 December 
2000) 
Since the introduction of the 
UST (since 1 January 2001) 
Type of tax Progressive Regressive 
Proportion of taxes 
allocated to social sector 
5-39.5% of the individual in-
come 
(Sum of contributions to funds) 
2-36.5 % of individual income 
Base for taxation Individual income (per annum) Individual income (per annum) 
Below 100,000 
roubles 
35.6% 
100,000-300,000 
roubles 
20.0% 
300,001-600,000 
roubles 
10.0% 
Progression  
Above 600,000 
roubles 
2.0% 
Number of funds Four Three 
28% 
employer 
Pension Fund: 
1% 
employee 
Pension Fund: 28.0% 
Health insurance 
Fund: 
3.6% Health insurance 
Fund: 
3.6% 
Employment Fund: 1.5% - - 
Proportions of tax 
allocated to the various 
social insurance funds 
Social Insurance 
Fund: 
5.4% Social Insurance 
Fund: 
4.0% 
Relationship between 
the Centre and the Sub-
jects of the Federation 
Decentralisation of receipts: 
100% of income tax to the fed-
eral entities 
Re-centralisation of social tax 
receipts: channelling via the 
federal budget 
Compiled by Susanne Nies, Berlin 2001. 
UST: Pros and Cons 
The goal of the UST was to improve the efficiency of the state social insurance system by 
means of a unified tax. The pros of this measure are: it increases tax revenues (this has been 
proven in 2001) by encouraging companies and individuals to legalise a larger share of incomes 
currently earned and paid in the shadow economy (regressive scale); the inclusion of all revenue 
and spending in the federal budget can vastly increase the transparency of the fiscal system; the 
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channelling of social payments through the federal budget allows the government to keep the 
off-budget funds on a short leash, reduce payments where money is wasted, and prevent corrup-
tion; it re-centralises the system in which the regions do not behave responsibly. There are, 
however, some cons: the regressive social tax might lead to bad targeting of social policy, 
which might not address the needy, specific problem groups, children etc.; the re-centralisation 
via UST could mean a loss of influence and responsibility for the regions; the Trety Sektor,66 
engaged in social welfare, may be seriously hurt. 
Evaluation 
The current reform of social security contributions makes transactions more transparent, thereby 
increasing the accountability of the social funds and reducing their power. The UST replaces 
many mandatory deductions that employers were formerly required to withhold from wages and 
that flew into the state pension fund, social insurance, or medical funds. Besides consolidating 
several payroll taxes and thus heavily simplifying the tax system, the introduction of the UST 
brings with it also a reduction in total deductions, which had amounted to 46 percent of wages. 
During the first five months of 2001, the revenues collected via the UST ran up to 3,948 million 
roubles. From this sum 3,364 million roubles were transferred to the Pension Fund. This was 
almost 10% more than the tax collectors had expected. Hence, at least in this respect trade union 
leaders, who have been predicting a bad future for the UST, appear to be wrong: the new system 
works, and it is effective. 
One argument against the UST that is often heard is that it undermines the development of so-
cial insurance institutions by breaking with a key principle of the organisation of social insur-
ance guaranteeing the equivalence of contributions and payments, i.e., the existence of a range 
of specific insurances. It is argued that contributions to the social funds are compensatory, 
which distinguishes them from taxes, which are levied as part of the governments fiscal policy. 
However, this argument does not lead to convincing conclusions. The UST is a different way of 
collecting social security contributions, but without immediate effect on the output. The UST is 
only one piece of the puzzle of social security reform, aimed at the simplification of the overall 
system. The key problem of the social security system, the poor targeting of social benefits, 
cannot be solved by the introduction of a different method of collecting the contributions. The 
UST may also lead to the violation of a fundamental principle of current legislation, under 
which off-budget funds cannot be used to cover household deficits. There is a danger that reve-
nues allocated to the social funds may be used for solving problems other than the financing of 
social services. This misuse of funds would hurt the poorest groups in society most. However, it 
still remains to be seen how the mixing of the federal budget and of off-budget revenues will 
change individual entitlements to benefits and their payout. 
                                                     
66 The Third Sector, non-commercial and non-state social welfare organisations. 
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Annex: Interview with Tat'yana Maleva (Susanne Nies) 
Moscow, 2 October 2001 
Tat'yana Maleva is Scholar-in-Residence and Post-Soviet Economies in Transition Program Co-
Chairperson, Carnegie Foundation, Moscow, and Director of the newly founded Institute for 
Social Policy, Nezavisimy institut sotsial'noi politiki, Moscow. 
Question: How would you assess, in general terms, the introduction of the UST and its impact 
on social policy? 
TM: There is no simple answer. It is positive that financing of social policy has become more 
transparent. Tax-income increased significantly. However, tax evasion is still possible. The 
regressive scale is positive, but it works only with big enterprises. There are still a lot of holes in 
the application of the UST regulations. I have nevertheless some doubts concerning the transi-
tion from an insurance system to a tax-based system. There are a lot of contradictions. NGOs, 
which are active in the social policy sector, are seriously affected by the new legislation. 
How would you evaluate the abolition of the employment fond and the fund system in general, 
both at the federal and at the regional level? 
It is positive that the fond structure was reconceived, and there was and is without any doubt a 
lot of abuse in the different funds. In my opinion, the abolition of the employment fund was a 
mistake. The fund was linked to an institute for research on employment, which was abolished 
as well. We will have no more reliable data on employment in the Federation. The conse-
quences will become obvious only in some years, but they will occur. The employment policy 
of the government today is limited to unemployment subsidies. At the moment, there is no ac-
tive employment policy. I think that the abolition of this fond was something like a test case for 
others. Others might follow, such as the healthcare fond: there could be something like a Rus-
sian NHS.67 The exception will be the pension sector since there are different interests (domestic 
fund raising etc.). 
How would you assess the impact of the introduction of the UST on specific areas such as the 
pension system, employment, education and health? 
The health sector in Russia is completely inefficient and has to be reformed as a whole. The 
problem is not money or taxes, but the structure. Our health system today was developed in the 
1960ies as a response to epidemics and the problems of large groups of the population. The 
approach was a quantitative one. Today an individual approach has to be introduced. I wouldnt 
put even one rouble in [the present] system. People compensate for the absence of state service 
by asking for supplementary help and paying for it themselves, but only 5 % of the population 
have the financial means to do so. 95% percent are entirely dependent on the State health-
system. A complete restructuring of the health-system is urgent and necessary. Unfortunately, I 
dont see the political will to do that. The Ministry of Health is one of the most conservative 
ministries. 
Problems of employment and education are closely linked. We have an education system with 
high standards, but this doesnt mean high work efficiency. A specific problem is education in 
the countryside. This is very expensive, and in fact is nonexistent. Quality is poor outside of the 
big cities. We have to reform the education system  as it is done now in Western countries  in 
the sense of life-long learning, permanent education (nepreryvnoe obrazovanie). 
What are the aims of your newly founded Institute for Social Policy (Nezavisimy institut sot-
sial'noi politiki)? 
                                                     
67 The National Health Service in the United Kingdom. 
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My institute came into being yesterday. It was set up with the aid of the Ford Foundation. It will 
be independent, and it will conduct research, seminars and it will have an archive. Concerning 
the latter, there is no place where the data from the former Soviet Union and now Russia are 
collected. Which means that we simply dont have them at our disposal. My institute will give 
grants to regional researchers for fieldwork, and also for research on specific areas of policy. 
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